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The "Albatross" of Immigration 
Reform: Temporary Worker Policy 
in the United States 
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr  
Cornell University 
Temporary worker policy in the United States traditionally has been 
advocated as a means to meet shortages for labor - a demand problem. 
Over the past decade, however, there has been support for the use of 
such policies as a means of addressing illegal immigration - a supply 
problem. Despite the fact that experiences show that such endeavors 
actually foster illegal immigration, the drive for immigration reform 
in the 1980s was seriously encumbered with a variety of attempts both 
to expand existing and to add new temporary worker programs. This 
article reviews the evolution of temporary worker policy and indicates 
how efforts to admit more temporary workers complicated the immi- 
gration reform process. Indeed, it was not until the major temporary 
worker proposals were finally removed from the Simpson-Rodino Act 
- by the adoption of a highly controversial "second amnesty" program 
(i .e. ,  the Schuiner Amendment) - that passage of legislation was 
achieved. Because this program functioned as a bargaining chip in the 
effort to establish a system of employer sanctions, it is unlikely that this 
expedient measure will set a precedent for future replication. Hence, it 
can be anticipated that efforts will eveiltually be made to revive 
temporary worker policy and, in the process, rekindle the debate over 
this contentious issue. 
For almost as long as the United States has sought to enforce general 
restrictions 011 immigration, there have been parallel legal steps to make 
formal exceptions for the admission of temporary foreign workers. The legal 
formats have changed and the number of participants have fluctuated 
widely. Nonetheless, the concept has persevered. Indeed, on each of the 
three occasions in the 1980s when Congress has debated comprehensive 
immigration refor~n, the subject of temporary workers has arisen as a subject 
of bitter contention. Many opponents to the immigration reform bills of the 
1980s were consistent in their positions by also opposing any effort to continue 
or to enlarge the extant temporary worker programs (e.g., organizations 
representing Hispanic groups). Other groups were willing to abandon their 
apposition if' the temporary worker programs were liberalized or expanded 
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(e.g., agricultural employers). Likewise, most strong supporters of immi- 
gration reform are adamantly opposed to temporary worker programs but 
were faced with the dilemma of accepting their inclusion as the price of 
passing the overall program (e.g., organized labor and the lobby group 
known as the Federation of Americans for Immigration Reform). Thus, 
temporary worker policy became an issue that made genuine immigration 
reform difficult. Indeed, the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986 (i.e., the Simpson-Rodino Act) was not possible until a myriad of 
pending temporary worker proposals were deleted and a "quick-fix" com- 
promise (i.e., the Schumer Amendment), that permitted the regularization of 
the immigration status of hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants who 
had worked in southwestern agriculture in 1986, was adopted. 
In this political context, it has been impossible to debate the efficacy of 
temporary worker policy on the basis of its merits. Impartial discussion 
tends to collapse in the wake of political expediency. This intellectual 
dilemma however, should not mask the fact that, in the 1980s, both the basic 
rationale and the specific format of the temporary worker programs that 
were proposed represent a sharp departure from their historical precedents. 
Traditionally, temporary worker programs in the United States have been 
designed to respond to shortages of labor - a demand problem. They were 
authorized during periods when the nation has been at war or on the verge of 
entering war. They were deemed necessary to meet short run labor bottlenecks 
when the labor force was expanding rapidly and unemployment was ex- 
tremely low. The resulting programs usually have had numerous protections 
for both cifizens and foreign workers built into their operational requirements 
although actual enforcement of these terms often left much to be desired. 
In contrast, the proposals of the 1980s have been motivated largely by 
concern over the mass abuse of the nation's immigration system by illegal 
immigrants - a supply problem. The nation is not engaged in any military 
crisis nor is there any other evidence of a general shortage of unskilled 
manpower. To  the contrary, the aggregate unemployment rate has consis- 
tently hovered in the seven percent or higher range with considerably 
higher rates prevailing for the subgroups of the labor force who generally 
provide workers for the nation's secondary labor markets. Furthermore, the 
designs of the proposed programs showed little concern for the welfare of 
either the participants or the citizen workers with whom they would compete. 
Given this departure in mission and format, it is a propitious time to 
examine this critical element of the nation's labor and immigration policies. 
THE TRADITIONAL RATIONALE 
It is possible to argue that the roots of temporary worker policy in the United 
States extend back to the Civil War era. Although there are no official 
unemployment figures for this period, it is generally conceded to have been 
a time of extreme labor shortages. In response, President Abraham Lincoln 
requested in late 1863 and Congress adopted in early 1864 the Contract Labor 
Act. This legislation enabled private employers to recruit foreign workers 
and to pay their transportation expenses to the United States. The enlisted 
workers, in turn, were required to sign legally binding contracts whereby 
they pledged their wages for up to twelve months to employers to repay these 
transportation expenses. Often they were induced to sign contracts for 
additional years to defray their living expenses during the initial year. Due 
to these procedural features, the program was widely criticized and the law 
was ultimately repealed in 1868. Contract labor, however, continued for 
many years afterward since the repeal of the law has not prohibited the actual 
practice. It was not until 1885 that the Alien Contract Law specifically 
banned such arrangements but, because of inadequate enforcement, the 
- 
practice continued for years afterward. 
Despite the surface features of the contract labor program, it did not 
technically constitute an antecedent to the temporary worker programs of 
the 20th Century. Many of the contract workers were recruited to be 
permanent immigrants. Indeed, the actual name of the Contract Labor Law 
was the "Act to Encourage Immigration". Moreover, throughout the brief 
period when contract labor was publicly authorized and the longer period 
when it continued informally, the nation essentially had an open-door 
immigration policy. Thus, the distinction between temporary workers and 
permanent immigrants was not really meaningful. If contract workers wanted 
to stay, they could and many did. 
It was the Immigration Act of 1917 that laid the actual foundations for 
temporary worker policy. This statute was the most restrictive immigration 
legislation to be adopted by the nation at that point. Among its features were 
provisions that allowed the Secretary of Labor to waive prohibitions in the 
Act (e.g., the need to pass the literacy test) for aliens from the Western 
Hemisphere who applied for temporary admission as workers. Thelegislation 
did not specify exactly what conditions were required to exist for the Secretary 
to exercise these powers. But, when the United States declared war on 
Germany in April, 1917, it was only a month later that the Secretary invoked 
the temporary worker provisions. H e  was responding to petitions from 
agricultural interests in the Southwest which predicted extensive shortages 
of farm labor [U.S. Senate, 1980:7]. Nationwide, the unemployment rate is 
estimated to have been 4.6 percent in 1917 and to have declined to 1.4 percent 
in 1918 [Lebergott, 1964:512]. The program subsequently admitted 76,802 
Mexican workers who were employed mainly in agriculture in the Southwest. 
Some workers, however, were also admitted for non-agricultural work on 
the railways. A few thousand additional workers from the Bahamas and from 
Canada were also admitted for other non-agricultural work. When the war 
ended in November, 1918, the use of the non-agricultural workers ceased but 
workers in agriculture continued to be employed until March, 1921 when the 
program was finally terminated except for certain "meritorious cases" that 
were permitted until 1922. Fewer than half of the total number of workers 
returned to Mexico [Kiser, 1972:130]. Rather than end reliance on Mexican 
workers, however, the program actually led to greater dependence on these 
workers in the Southwest in subsequent years albeit often as illegal immigrants 
[Scruggs, 1960:319]. 
The involvement of the United States in World War 11 again led to pleas 
from agricultural interests in the Southwest for a revival of a temporary 
workers program to meet projected labor shortages. In  1942 the nationwide 
unemployment was 4.7 percent but it declined rapidly to 1.9 percent in 1943; 
1.2 percent in 1944; and 1.9 percent in 1945. Initially, in 1942 the provisions 
of the Immigration Act of 1917 were used to activate such a program until 
special legislation was enacted under an omnibus appropriation bill known 
as P.L. 45 in August 1942. Under this legislation, the Mexican Labor Program 
was created (more popularly referred to as the "bracero program"). P.L. 45 
was formally extended following the end of World War I1 until December 
31, 1947 although it continued to function informally and unregulated until 
1951. In 1951, with the nation again embroiled in a major military conflict in 
Korea, the bracero program was offically revived under P. L. 78. The national 
unemployment rate for 1951 was 3.3 percent and it fell further to 3.1 percent 
in 1952 and to 2.9 percent in 1953. When the Korean Conflict ended in 1953, 
however, the revived bracero program continued as the result of three 
separate legislative extensions before it was unilaterally terminated by the 
United States on December 31, 1964. 
The bracero program was authorized under special congressional legis- 
lation that was separate from the nation's immigration statutes. The details 
concerning the bracero program have been carefully researched [Craig, 
1971; Galarza, 1964; and Garcia y Griego, 19831. Suffice to say, the program 
at its height in 1956 involved almost one-half million Mexican workers a 
year. There were extensive charges of corruption by Mexican officials in the 
selection of the participants. Although the program mandated wage pro- 
tections as well as an extensive array of assurances for medical care, 
transportation, meals at reasonable costs and free housing, many of these 
protections were inadequately, if at all, provided by U.S. employers. The 
program adversely impacted both wage and employment opportbnities of 
citizen workers - many of whom were Chicanos [Briggs, 197?,:29; and 
President's Commission on Migratory Labor, 1951 :59]. The bracero program 
served to expose the Mexican workers to the broad range of employment 
opportunities, higher wages and better working conditions that the U.S. 
labor market offered relative to Mexico. As a consequence, it institutionalized 
the process whereby many former bracero workers - having been exposed 
to,the U.S. labor market continued to seek work in the U.S. in subsequent 
years as illegal immigrants after the program ended. 
It was also during World War I1 that the United States established a 
similar temporary worker program with various governments in the British 
West Indies [U.S. Senate, 19781. Known as the British West Indies Labor 
Program (BWI), it was designed primarily to meet demands of East Coast 
agricultural interests in that they too were experiencing labor shortages. 
Although its scale was considerably smaller - involving about 24,000 workers 
at its peak, it did exert a significant impact on the local labor markets where it 
functioned. The BWI program, unlike the bracero program, also made 
workers available for non-agricultural employment during the war years. 
The BWI program functioned from 1943 to 1947 under the same umbrella 
legislation as the bracero program - P.L. 45. From 1947 to 1952, after P.L. 45 
expired, the BWI program continued to operate but it was converted into a 
temporary worker program under the aegis of the Immigration Act of 1917. 
A presidential review of the BWI program in 1951 led to extensive criticism 
of the administration of the program for its "lack of vigilance for the protection 
of living and working standards" of the participants [President's Commission 
on Migratory Labor, 1951:58]. 
In 1952, during the midst of the Korean Conflict, the Inlmigration and 
Nationality Act was passed. Among its features were significant changes in 
the nation's temporary worker policy. The Act established the principle 
whereby all non-citizens entering the United States must be classified as 
iinilligrants or non-immigrants. The nonimmigrant classification, in turn, 
listed twelve separate classifications - each subsequently known by the 
letter and number specified in the legislation. One of these provisions - 
section H-2 - established the classification "other temporary workers". It is 
this grouping of nonimmigrants - the H-2 workers who are given permission 
to be admitted only for work that is itself temporary in nature - that hasover 
the years generated the most controversy. By creating a special mechanism 
for the admission of teinporary workers, this legislation has replaced the 
need to rely on the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1917. The new 
legislation did, however, specifically repeal the Alien Contract Labor Act of 
1885 with its ban on the use of contract labor. As for the BWI program, it was 
simply subsumed under the H-2 rubric. The employers of BWI workers 
successfully resisted efforts to i~lcorporate their program into P.L. 78 that 
had revived the bracero program in 1952. They correctly saw that P.L. 78 was 
outside the regular imn~igration laws. They favored legislation that would 
be securely authorized within the structure of the nation's basic immigration 
statutes. 
I n  theory, H-2 workers can only be admitted if unemployed citizens and 
permanent resident aliens cannot be found to perform the needed job. 
There are procedures established by the Department of Labor that require 
prior efforts to recruit citizen workers as well as to pay wages and to provide 
benefits based upon prevailing labor market conditions. The highest number 
of H-2 visas that have been issued was in 1969 when 69,228 H-2 workers were 
admitted. Since then, the number has declined to about 23,000 to 25,000 
visas a year, (See,Appendix). Within the H-2 category, about one-half of 
those admitted in recent years have been agricultural workers (mostly as 
sugar cane harvesters in Florida, apple pickers in New York and Virginia, 
and loggers in Maine). Most of the remainder are various professional and 
technical workers who are generally of a lower status than those admitted 
under the separate H-1 classification of temporary workers of "distinguished 
ability or merit". Most of the non-agricultural H-2 workers are lesser known 
writers, musicians, artists, entertainers, and athletes. The remainder cover 
the spectrum of occupations. 
There have been two infamous applications to the H-2 program in the 
micro labor markets of the U.S. territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands. 
In  both instances, the H-2 worker concept was seriously perverted by the 
failure to restrict the occupations in which these workers found employment 
and the time duration (which extended into years) they were allowed to 
remain employed on these islands. As a consequence, H-2 workers adversely 
impacted the local wage and employment conditions as well as served to 
foster extensive illegal immigration by other workers from their same 
homelands before the programs were terminated [Briggs, 1984:109-113; U.S. 
House of Representatives, 1975; and U.S. House of Representatives, 19791. 
It has been the use of H-2 workers in agriculture that has, over the years, 
generated the most controversy. These criticisms have cut deeper than 
simply the issue of whether these foreign workers take jobs that might 
otherwise be available to citizen workers and permanent resident aliens. 
They have centered upon the operational features of the program that are 
considered to be unfair and, if applied to citizens, would be illegal. They are 
unfair because employers do  not have to pay social security taxes or 
unemployment compensation payroll taxes on H-2 workers that would be 
required if citizens were hired. The program also permits actions that would 
be illegal elsewhere in the economy because of the use of industry blacklists; 
the fact that workers are subject to arbitrary treatment and dismissals; and 
the use of a system whereby employers are permitted to request back by 
name the following year only 60 percent of those workers hired during the 
current year (which means that workers are forced to compete with each 
other to curry the favor of employers [U.S. House of Representatives, 19831). 
The agricultural H-2 program is especially attractive to employers because 
it serves to guarantee the employer a set work force. If any worker is 
dismissed, dissatisfied, injured, or ill, he will be replaced by another grateful 
worke'r who is selected by his government - often under terms that require 
kickbacks or are the result of political favoritism. 
Each manifestation of a temporary worker program was introduced at a 
time when the nation was at war. Under these circumstances when unem- 
ployment was low and labor shortages were real, the need for such under- 
takings seemed logical. In every instance, the programs continued long after 
the military emergencies ended. In peacetime, the logic of their zxistence - 
especially when aggregate unemployment has been high - ceases to be 
compelling. Instead, the conditions under which foreign workers are 
employed seem only to be beneficial to the self-interest of employers who 
find such workers highly desireable when in comparison to citizen workers. 
Under the auspices of these programs, they can obtain a relatively more 
docile labor force that is almost impossible to unionize and who can be 
treated in an arbitrary manner with impunity. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that an employer attitude study in the San Diego, California area in 1982 
towards the prospects of a new foreign worker program showed strong 
positive support [Nalvern and Frederickson, 19811. The study found that the 
employers did not fear that they would go out of business if they had to pay 
competitive wages for citizen workers or that they could not find available 
citizen workers at prevailing wage rates. Rather, the employers simply 
believed they could make more profits by paying lower wages as the result of 
hiring foreign workers than if they had to seek citizen workers. 
The most tragic aspect of the on-going efforts by fruit and vegetable 
employers to maintain and to expand their sources of cheap farm labor is the 
fact that the tactic "spells disaster in the long run" for the industry [Martin: 
1983,591. This is because the debate over the need for foreign temporary 
workers has diverted attention away from the greater challenge to the survival 
of the domestic agricultural industry: foreign product competition. Access 
to cheap foreign labor sources may benefit the industry in the short run. But 
their availability, as Philip Martin (1983) has persuasively argued, blinds 
agricultural interests to the imperative for rapid technological change if 
they are to compete with foreign producers who can still rely upon far 
cheaper labor supplies. If it is the case that citizen farm workers cannot be 
found at competitive wages and working conditions, Martin shows that it 
would be preferable to accelerate the mechanization of the industry than to 
rely upon a self-defeating addiction to labor-intensive production techniques. 
T H E  EMERGENCE OF A PROPOSED NEW ROLE 
Although the issue of illegal immigration into the United States has existed 
for as long as there have been efforts to restrict immigration, the nation has 
only periodically sought to confront the problem. One effort was the infamous 
border sweep associated with "Operation Wetback" in 1954-5 and another 
was the unsuccessful legislative effort to adopt employer sanctions against 
hiring illegal immigrants in the early 1970s. Some portion of the illegal 
immigrant flow - especially from Mexico - has involved persons who are 
not interested in permanent settlement. Instead, this sub-group of the illegal 
immigrant population constitutes an "unofficial" temporary labor force that 
seeks employment in such seasonal industries as agriculture, construction, 
recreation, food services, and lodgings. In  the off-season, these workers 
typically return to their homelands. Hence, as part of the quest to find a 
comprehensive solution to the illegal immigration problem, proposals have 
been made to enlarge the nation's official temporary worker policy so as to 
legalize the status of these illegal immigrants by making them nonimmigrant 
workers. 
Support for this new role for temporary worker policy has come from a 
number of immigration scholars. W.R. Bohning [I979 and 19841, for instance, 
cited the post WorldWarII experienceof Western Europe with "guestworkers"' 
as an example that the U.S. should follow. Charles Keely [1979: 60-21- offered 
a similar proposal. Keely, however, coupled his suggestion for a new 
temporary worker program with the requirement that the United States also 
sharply increase its labor standard enforcement activities as well as adopt 
employer sanctions to discourage other illegal immigrants from being 
employed. Likewise, in response to a specific request by President Jimmy 
Carter to the National Commission on Manpower Policy in 1977, a special 
study was prepared for the Commission by Edwin Reubens on the use of 
temporary worker programs as a means of reducing illegal immigration. 
Reubens subsequently offered two alternatives: one was to create an entirely 
new temporary worker program and the second was to expand and improve 
the existing H-2 program [National Commission on Manpower Policy, 
19791. The new temporary worker proposal called for a program that would 
be significantly larger than the present H-2 program in terms of the number 
of workers permitted to enter each year. These workers would be restricted 
to those jobs of low skill, low paid work which currently are often filled by 
illegal immigrants [National Commission on Manpower Policy, 1979:59]. 
The workers could work in the United States for one year with possible 
contract renewals for up  to three more years. They would not be able to bring 
their families with them. After their contract period expired, they would 
have to return to their homeland. Keubens pointed out that, to be effective in 
absorbing jobs currently held by illegal aliens who were only temporarily in 
the United States, the program would have to enroll "hundreds of thousands" 
of temporary workers a year. The alternative proposal suggested by Keclbens 
was to keep the H-2 program at its present level but to enhance procedures to 
recruit citizen workers for low wage jobs before turning to the H-2 option. 
This would be done by improving job information channels, upgrading 
existing jobs, enhancing mobility, and providing more training for low 
skilled workers. After studying the Reubens proposal, the Commission 
wrote to the Secretary of Labor that it was "strongly against" any new 
expanded H-2 program [Ginzberg, 1979:2]. As for the existing agricultural 
H-2 program, the Chairman of the Commission wrote: 
With respect to the H-2 issue, the beginning of wisdom is to recognize 
that farmers are a vocal political force and that one should not tangle 
with them unless one must, because of their ability to weaken those in 
office who oppose them. It seems to me therefore the better part of 
wisdom for the Secretary of Labor to suffer with the present awkward 
program rather than to attempt any radical revision that would bring 
these small but powerful special groups down on them. [National 
Commission for Manpower Policy, 1979: 109-1101. 
The proposals by Bohning, Keely, Keubens and a few others are essentially 
conceptual sketches. Each only scratched the surface of the details of how 
such an undertaking would actually work. What is of importance about these 
proposals was the fact that each was seriously proposed as a way to address 
the problem of illegal immigration in the United States. 
In the meantime, Congress - which was reluctant to act upon a series of 
legislative reforms offered by President Carter in 1977 to address illegal 
immigration - created the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee 
Policy to study all aspects of the nation's immigration policy. In its final 
report issued in 1981, the Select Commission acknowledged that the extant 
H-2 program was deserving of extensive criticism but that the continuation 
of the program is necessary and preferable to the institution of any new 
program [Select Commission, 1981 :227]. The Select Commission did suggest 
that the administration of the H-2 program be "streamlined" and, to remove 
any inducement for employers to favor H-2 workers over citizens, that 
employers be required to pay both social security and unemployment 
compensation payroll taxes for H-2 workers. The  Select Commission, 
however, advised that 110 new temporary worker program be established as 
part of a possible strategy against illegal immigration [Select Commission, 
1981 :45]. 
By the time the Select Commission issued its final report, the Reagan 
Administration had replaced the Carter Administration. As the Reagan 
campaign had ignored the immigration issue, it had no pre-established 
gositioil. Helice, a task force was established to prepare a response to the 
Sclcct Commission's recomll~endations. On July 30, 1981, the task force 
issl~ed its report. I n  i t ,  there was no mention made of the H-2 program but 
the report did call for the creation of an "experimental temporary worker 
progra111 for iV\cxican nationals" [U.S. Department of Justice, 1981: 51. 
Labeling it as a two year "pilot program", 50,000 Mexican nationals a year 
would be admitted to work in the United States as temporary workers. If the 
pilot program worked satisfactorily, it was understood that the number of 
temporary workers could subsequently be increased dramatically [Nalvern 
and Frederickson, 1982:1]. The Reagan proposal for a new temporary worker 
program was linked to a comprehensive effort to combat illegal immigration 
that included employer sanctions and amnesty proposals. Thus, the Ad- 
ministration's proposal revived the idea that temporary worker policy should 
be part of the nation's effort to attack the problem of illegal immigration. 
INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION REFORM IN THE 1980s 
The Reagan Administration's position - including the pilot program for 
temporary workers - was subsequently drafted into a bill known as the 
Omnibus Immigration and Control Act of 1981. For a variety of reasons, 
however, this bill was so deficient in its content that it was never acted upon 
by Congress. Instead, a bi-partisan bill was prepared by Senator Alan Simpson 
(R-Wy) and Congressman Romano Mazzoli (D-Ky) which they jointed 
introduced to Congress in 1982. It was a comprehensive attempt to reform all 
phases of the nation's immigration system. 
The Simpson-Mazzoli bill of 1982 did not mention a new temporary 
worker program but it did adhere to the suggestions of the Select Commission 
by proposing ways to make the H-2 program more accessible to employers. 
As previously discussed, the H-2 program has traditionally been used by 
agricultural employers along the East Coast but not by those in the Southwest. 
The growers in the Southwest have, since the termination of their bracero 
program, relied extensively upon illegal immigrants to pick their speciality 
produce of vegetables and fruits. Southwestern growers have felt that the 
federal government does not approve employer petitions fast enough to 
meet their needs to harvest these perishable crops. The move to liberalize 
the H-2 program was seen as a way to ween Southwestern growers away from 
their dependence on illegal immigrants whose employment would be illegal 
if employer sanctions were adopted. 
The Simpson-Mazzoli bill easily passed the U.S. Senate but in the House 
of Representatives it encountered stiff opposition. One of the key topics that 
served as a lightening rod to rally opponents to the bill were the suggested 
H-2 changes. The H-2 provisions of the existing law place no ceiling on the 
number of temporary workers who can be admitted in any year. Thus, the 
number of H-2 workers can easily increase at any time if the approval process 
of employer applications is expedited and if any particular Administration 
is sympathetic. The proposed reform bill would have allowed the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture - a traditionally employer-oriented agency of 
government - to share responsibility with the U.S. Department of Labor for 
the operation of the program. Moreover, the Attorney General would still 
have been allowed to overrule any negative decision made by these agencies. 
Thus, organized labor (i.e., the AFL-CIO) which supported most of the bill 
joined with many Hispanic organizations to assail both the proposed chasges 
and the retention of the entire H-2 program. As the president of the Mexican 
~ k e r i c a n  Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) charged: "The 
Simpson-Mazzoli H-2 program is really just a replay of the bracero program" 
that would actually "foster" illegal immigration just as the old program had 
done [Joaquin G. Avila, 1982: A-261. As action on the bill had been delayed 
until the end of the congressional session, the discord over the temporary 
work provisions contributed to the bill's death on the floor of the House in 
mid-December 1982. 
In 1983, somewhat different versions of the bill - reflecting the actions 
taken during the previous session by each house of Congress - were 
re-introduced. Again, the Senate version did not mention any new temporary 
worker program but it did provide for easing employer accessibility for H-2 
workers. The House version also eased the H-2 provisions but, in addition, 
it called for the creation of a three year transitional temporary worker 
program that would permit agricultural employers time to adjust to the 
proposed future ban on the employment of illegal immigrants. During the 
first year the bill took effect, agricultural employers could still hire a labor 
force that was composed entirely of illegal immigrants; during the second 
year, 67 percent of the employer's work force could be illegal immigrants; 
during the third year the percentage was reduced to 33 percent; and by the 
fourth year, the transitional program would be terminated. Under this 
program, the grower would have been required to notify the Department of 
Labor of the number of illegal immigrant workers who were hired and a 
special permit would have been issued for each designated foreign worker. 
No ceiling was placed on the number of illegal immigrant workers who could 
be hired so the precise number of foreign workers involved would not have 
been known. Conceivably, the number could have been as high as several 
hundred thousand workers. Opponents of the transitional worker program 
argued that it represented a "contradiction" to the expressed goals of the 
immigration reform movement since it, like the other temporary worker 
programs, would only serve to encourage more Mexican workers to come 
and to remain in the United States [League of Latin American Citizens, 
1983:5]. They also opposed the program because, unlike the H-2 and earlier 
temporary worker programs, the transitional program contained virtually 
no worker protection requirements nor did it provide any monitoring 
mechanism. 
The U.S. Senate overwhelmingly passed its reform bill in May, 1983. In 
the House, the bill languished for over a year before it finally received a rule 
that would permit floor debate in June, 1984. During the ensuing floor 
debate, an amendment was added to create an entirely new temporary 
worker program for agricultural workers. Proposed by Congressmen Leon 
Panetta (D-Cal.) and Sid Morrison (R-Wash.), it would have permitted 
temporary farmworkers to be admitted to the United States to harvest fruits 
and vegetables for up to eleven months a year. Unlike agricultural H-2 
workers, these workers would be free to move from employer to employer 
within a specified geographical region. The program had no fixed duration. 
The number of temporary workers to be admitted each year would be left to 
the Attorney General to decide after consultation with the Secretaries of 
Labor and of Agriculture. The Attorney General would have had as little as 
72 hours to respond to urgent requests from employers for such workers. As 
the Attorney General and the Department of Justice have no expertise in 
labor market analysis, it was believed by many observers that decisions - 
especially those requiring quick notice - would likely be based upon political 
rather than economic considerations. It was estimated that the number of 
such temporary workers could have easily totalled as many as a half-million 
workers a year [Pear, 1984: B-51. Agricultural interests made it known that 
inclusion of this open-ended program was their bottom line for support of 
the overall immigration bill. Senator Simpson would later bitterly call this 
action by agricultural employers "the epitome of greed" [Hume, 1985: 641. 
On the other hand, the amendment greatly strengthened the hand of 
opponents to the entire bill. Congressman Henry Gonzales (D-Tex.) charged 
that the amendment "would even offend a slave driver" since it did "not even 
provide the skeletal labor protections that existed under the infamous bracero 
program" [New York Times, 1984, A-201. H e  labeled the amendment as a 
"rent a slave" device. The AFL-CIO, which until this point had favored the 
bill's passage, suddenly withdrew its support. The amended bill finally did 
pass the House but only by a narrow five vote margin. As events were to 
reveal themselves, the entire bill ultimately died in a Senate-House conference 
committee on October 11, 1984, While other issues were involved, the 
temporary worker provisions were a major part of the explanation for the 
loss of key support needed to pass the bill. 
Having witnessed for the second time the process by which temporary 
worker policy had contributed to the demise of immigration reform, the 
Reagan Administration in January, 1985 initiated a plan that might remove 
this contentious issue from the next legislative attempt to pass immigration 
reform. Namely, the Administration began considerations to liberalize the 
H-2 regulations unilaterally by administrative action [Pear, 1985a: A-11. 
The regulation changes, once published in the Federal Register and after 
public comments were received and responded to, could be issued by the 
INS as final rules which carry the full force of law. Among the major planned 
changes were the following: employers would no longer have to make 
extensive searches for citizen workers if the U.S Department of Agriculture 
declares that "perishable crops are in danger due to unforseen emergency"; 
H-2 workers could remain in the United States for 20 days after they had 
completed one job to look for work with another agricultural employer 
(under existing law they could not look for work elsewhere and would have 
to return to their homeland when their original job was completed); and 
employers would be able to pay a housing allowance to H-2 workers in lieu of 
providing actual housing as is the prevailing policy. The revised rules 
would also specify that employers of H-2 workers would have to give consent 
to INS officials to enter their fields and to inspect their records to check for 
illegal immigrants without meeting the current requirement to secure a 
court warrant in advance. Any agricultural employer who was found to have 
a pattern of employing illegal immigrants would be barred for one year from 
use of temporary workers. 
Agricultural employers, when informed of these suggested changes, 
acknowledged that they did "demonstrate a sensitivity to the needs of 
agriculture". Nonetheless, they were still not satisfied [Pear, 1985a: A-11. 
They feared that what one Administration may change by regulations, a 
later Administration could reverse by regulation. Hence, they made it clear 
that even if the changes were made, they still intended to press for statuatory 
enactment of these principles. Likewise, the traditional opponents to tem- 
porary worker policy were quick to voice their opposition to these admini- 
strative proposals. The United Farm Workers (AFL-CIO) stated that they 
were against "every" change that would make it easier to admit temporary 
workers under any program. Likewise, MALDEF voiced its absolute oppo- 
sition to these changes because they permitted exploitation of foreign workers 
and they would undermine efforts to unionize farm workers. Hence, it 
seemed inevitable that the H-2 revisions would again become part of the 
debate over immigration reform despite these efforts to short-circuit the 
issue. Because no one seemed sympathetic to this alternative, the Reagan 
Administration has not yet promulgated any of these changes. 
Meanwhile, for the third time in four years, Senator Simpson introduced 
in May 1985 another immigration reform bill. It focussed almost exclusively 
on the issue of illegal immigration. The lingering problems associated with 
legal immigration, refugees, and asylees were simply put aside. There was 
no mention of a new temporary worker program but the changes in the H-2 
program that would make it easier for employer application to be approved 
and the three-year transition program for agricultural employers were both 
re-introduced. When the bill went on the Senate floor for debate in September, 
1986, no feature of the bill caused more rancor than the topic of temporary 
workers. On September 12, Senator Pete Wilson (R-Cal.) offered an amend- 
ment that would create a new temporary worker program in addition to the 
aforementioned features already in the bill. The Reagan Administration 
was divided over its views on the Wilson amendment. The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) and the Department of Labor publicly opposed 
the amendment but the Department of Justice was sympathetic. Avoiding a 
specific endorsement of the Wilson amendment, the Administration issued a 
bland homily that called for a "self-financed, limited seasonal worker program 
which would provide field harvest labor for perishable commodities" [Pear, 
1985b: A-171. When the vote was taken, the Wilson amendment failed, 50 to 
48. A week later, however, the Senate reversed itself and, on a 51-44 vote, 
added the amendment to the bill. The only significant difference between 
the defeated amendment and the adopted amendment was that the latter had 
an explicit limit of 350,000 temporary workers who would be allowed in the 
United States at any one time during the first three years. This cap was 
designed to respond to the charge that the original bill would have been an 
open-ended authorization for seasonal wor!rers. After three years, the 
amendment specified that the Attorney General could set a new ceiling 
based on the experiences of the program. A subsequent amendment, offered 
by Senator Paul Simon (D-Ill.), however, was later adopted that would have 
limited the life of this program to 33 months unless a specific new law was 
passed by both houses to extend it. In this amended form, the entire 
immigration reform bill was passed overwhelmingly by the Senate on 
September 19, 1985. 
Thus, of all the controversial features contained in the Simpson bill - 
employer sanctions, amnesty to most illegal immigrants already in the 
country, and reimbursements to states by the federal government for the 
increased social costs associated with the amnesty program - it was the 
temporary worker provision that stirred up the most passionate debate. 
Senator Wilson argued that there would be crops rotting in the fields if the 
temporary worker program was not included and if Southwestern growers 
could no longer hire illegal immigrants. Senator Metzenbaum (D-Ohio.), 
who opposed the program painted a scene of foreign workers "sleeping in 
ditches and plastic bags" in the rural areas where the temporary workers 
would toil. His conclusion was based on the provisions of the Wilson program 
that would allow growers to provide a housing allowance in lieu of actually 
providing housing itself. After passage, a MALDEF spokesman stated that 
with the Wilson amendment "the growers have been able to turn an immi- 
gration bill into an agricultural worker bill" [Pear, 1985c: A-21]#. By all 
accounts, the Wilson proposal offered fewer worker protections and required 
less from employers than any temporary worker program that had ever 
before been adopted by the United States. A comparison of many of the key 
features of the much criticized bracero program with the Wilson program 
shows the bracero program to have been far more concerned about protecting 
both citizen and foreign worker rights and welfare [Congressional Record - 
Senate: 1985, S116861. For instance, the Wilson program did not require 
domestic recruitment as a prerequisite for approval of applications of foreign 
workers and it did not require that the Department of Labor certify there is a 
shortage of U.S. workers. It did not guarantee to U.S. workers that employ- 
ment terms at least be comparable to those offered foreign workers. Unlike 
the bracero program, the Wilson program did not guarantee foreign workers 
a written contract or guarantee a minimum period of work or guarantee that 
meals would be provided at cost. Clearly, the Wilson program assumed 
extensive employer goodwill in the conduct of the program - a conclusion 
that past history does not support. 
As has been the case in the two earlier attempts to pass immigration 
reform, the House of Representatives waited for the Senate to go first. 
Unlike the past, advocates of immigration reform in the House did not 
co-sponsor the bill that had been introduced in the Senate. Instead, the 
House version - introduced jointly in September 1985 by Congressmen 
Peter Rodino (D-N. J . )  and Romano Mazzoli (D-Ky) - differed significantly 
in many of its key elements pertaining to ways to address the illegal 
immigration problem. For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to say 
that the bill did propose to ease the administrative regulations pertaining to 
the agricultural H-2 programs and it also contained provision for the three 
year transitional program for illegal immigrants employed in agriculture. 
During the mark-up of the bill by the immigration subcommittee of the 
House Judiciary Committee, however, the transitional temporary program 
was deleted. The original bill, however, did not contain any mention of a 
new temporary worker program. Indeed, Congressman Rodino indicated 
that he was "deeply disappointed" by the addition of the Wilson amendment 
to the Senate bill and he indicated that the Senate action would greatly 
complicate the process of ultimately passing any immigration reform [Pear: 
1985~, A-21. 
For ten months after the Senate passed its version of immigration reform, 
there was no visible action taken by the Judiciary Committee of the House of 
Representatives. Behind the scenes, however, lengthy negotiations took 
place over the issue of the temporary worker provisions contained in the 
draft and possible additional amendments. Involved were proponents of 
farm workers; supporters of agricultural business interests; and advocates of 
a compromise solution between these two contending groups in order that 
the immigration reform bill could be debated. Finally, in early June 1986, 
Congressman Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), a leader of the compromise group, 
announced that agreement had been reached on a plan to end the stalemate 
[Pear, 1986a, A-191. Essentially, it stated that the Attorney General could 
grant lawful permanent resident status to any illegal immigrant who could 
prove that he had been working in perishable agriculture for at least 20 full 
days from May 1, 1985 to May 1, 1986. If some of these workers subsequently 
quit working in agriculture, the proposal also provided a means to "replenish" 
the labor supply with additional illegal aliens who could also subsequently 
become resident aliens. 
The rationale for providing the opportunity for those illegal immigrants 
who have been recently employed in southwestern agriculture to rapidly 
become aliens was multifold. Its primary intention was to overcome the 
opposition of southwestern growers to the possibility of employer sanctions 
that would make several hundred thousand of their current employers 
ineligible to be retained. As discussed earlier, these agricultural employers 
continued to be adamant in their assertion that citizen workers could not be 
attracted to meet their seasonal demand for workers to pick perishable crops. 
Of equal importance was the fact that the amendment also overcame the fears 
of supporters of immigration reform who opposed the idea of a new 
guestworker program as provided by the Wilson Amendment. By allowing 
those illegal immigrants who have been employed in agriculture to have a 
unique right to obtain resident alien status by virtue of their past employment 
record and, if they choose, to become naturalized citizens later, these workers 
could now have most of the protections and freedoms available to non- 
agricultural citizen workers. Given resident alien status, these workers would 
be able to qualify for some social entitlement programs in the off-season. 
Moreover, they would not be forced to remain agricultural workers (ie.,  they 
would not be tied to employers as "serfs") if better job opportunities should 
become available to them. For those who remained in agriculture, it would 
be easier for them to be unionized if they knew that they could remain 
permanently in the United States. An additional attraction of the Schumer 
Amendment to growers was that it also included a complex provision that 
would allow for "replenishment" of farm workers after 1989 for those newly 
legalized aliens who subsequently exercise their prerogative to find em- 
ployment outside of the agricultural industry. Thus, this ingenious com- 
promise provided a balance between the demands of growers for an adequate 
supply of labor and the insistence of union and Hispanic groups that 
agricultural workers be protected from the gross opportunities for exploitation 
that have been traditionally associated with temporary worker programs in 
the past. 
The immediate reaction to the Schumer Amendment, however, was far 
from positive. Indeed, it became an immediate subject of intense controversy. 
Nonetheless, it accomplished its primary purpose: it broke the logjam in the 
House Judiciary Committee that had prevented the bill from reaching the 
floor. On June 25,1986 the Committee voted 19 to 16 to add the amendment, 
with only slight modification, to the bill. The revised version specified that 
permanent resident alien status would be provided to illegal immigrants if 
they had worked in agriculture for U.S. employers for not less than 60 days 
during the 12 months that preceded May 1, 1986. At this point, however, 
Congressman Mazzoli threatened to abandon the entire bill. Calling the 
amendment "unparalleled, unprecedented, and unacceptable", he pessi- 
mistically predicted that "passage of the Schumer Amendment ensures the 
bill's doom" [Daily Labor Report, p. A-31. Nonetheless, the next day the 
Judiciary Committee voted 25 to 10 to send the amended bill to the floor of 
the House. 
For a time, it seemed that Mazzoli's prediction would prove true. The bill 
was not taken up by the House Rules Committee until late September 1986. 
When it was, House Minority whip, Trent Lott (R-Miss), called the Schumer 
Amendment "the most controversial issue" in the entire bill and Repre- 
sentative D-Lungren (R-Cal.), a strong supporter of immigration reform, 
called the amendment "an abomination" that would "kill the bill" [Pear, 
1986c, p. 311. When the debate rules were established, however, they forbade 
any amendments to be made to the fragile terms of the Schumer Amendment. 
The other key provisions of the bill - employer sanctions and amnesty - 
could be debated on the floor and were subject to possible deletion - but not 
any feature of the foreign agricultural worker proposal could be discussed. 
Its fate was linked to the passage of the overall bill. 
A resolution to adopt the debate rules which contained this ban was 
offered on the floor of the House on September 26,1986. By a vote of 202-180 
the resolution on the rules was defeated. With the Congress planning to 
adjourn the next week, the prospects for an immigration reform bill appeared 
to be lost again. All fingers of blame were immediately pointed to the 
provision in the rules that prohibited debate on the Schumer Amendment 
[Pear, 1986d, p.81 
PASSAGE OF THE SIMPSON-RODINO ACT 
Amid an outcry of critical editorials by the nation's print media in the days 
that immediately followed the defeated vote on the rules, a completely 
unexpected window of opportunity for the resurrection of immigration 
reform was suddenly created. The Congress had not yet passed a military 
appropriation bill which contained several controversial foreign policy 
provisions. In addition, the President had not yet signed another controversial 
bill pertaining to the creation of a large environmental "superfund" and 
there was congressional fear that, if Congress adjourned, the President 
would kill the bill with a pocket veto. It was at this point that it was publicly 
announced on October 7,1986 that President Reagan would meet personally 
with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland on October 
11 and 12. Hence, Congress could not force the showdown on the appro- 
priation bill while the President was out of the country at a summit meeting 
on the possibility of setting an agenda for nuclear disarmament. Thus, an 
unexpected pause in its planned activities was forced on Congress. Adjourn- 
ment had to be postponed. Behind the scenes negotiations on the immigration 
bill were quickly renewed. A minor change was made in the provisions of the 
Schumer Amendment. The number of days an illegal immigrant who had 
worked in agriculture in the year preceding May 1, 1986 to be eligible for 
eventual adjustment of status to become a resident alien was increased from 
60 to 90 days. Given the inability to act on the other critical issues, the 
Houses of Representatives reversed itself on October 9,1986 and voted 278 to 
129 to accept the debate rules. Fourteen amendments would be debated but 
there could not be any debate on the Schumer provisions. A marathon 
session began and, late in the evening of October 9, 1986, the House passed 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act ( i e . ,  the Simpson-Rodino bill) by a 
vote of 230 to 166. 
A Senate-House conference committee was constituted and it reached 
agreement on October 14, 1986. In the conference, the Senate proposals for 
the Wilson Program and for the transitional farm worker program were 
deleted; the House proposal for the Schumer provisions were retained. On 
October 15, 1986, the House voted 238 to 173 to accept the conference report 
and the Senate did likewise on October 17, 1986 by a vote of 63-24. President 
Reagan signed the historic bill into law on November 6, 1986. 
THE BYPASS OF THE BARRIER TO IMMIGRATIONREFORM 
The Schumer Amendment, which had formerly been cited as being "the 
villainous obstacle", was now hailed as being the "miraculous compromise" 
that had made immigration reform possible. What has been lost in the 
euphoria surrounding the passage of the Simpson-Rodino bill, however, is 
the fact that it was not until the temporary worker issue was essentially 
removed from the bill by the creation of a program for permanent adjustment 
of status - a "second amnesty program" is probably a better description of 
the Schumer Amendment - that the bill was able to pass. For as Repre- 
sentative Rodino clearly stated during the final vote on the conference 
report, "this program ( i e . ,  the Schumer Amendment) has none of the elements 
of the old Bracero Program and can in no way be classified as a guestworker 
program". [Congressional Record - House: 1986, H 105851. 
Under the adopted legislation, therefore, any illegal immigrant who had 
worked 90 days in the perishable agriculture industry during the twelve 
month period prior to May 1, 1986 can apply to a newly created category of 
being a temporary resident alien. These applications are to be made during 
the period from May 1, 1987 to November 1, 1988. After two years in this 
status, they may apply for adjustment to become lawful permanent resident 
aliens. After the customary five years as permanent resident aliens they can 
apply to become naturalized U.S. citizens. In addition, the law specifies for 
persons who meet the 90 day requirement for work in the year ending May 1, 
1986 and who also had worked 90 days in the perishable agriculture industry 
during the twelve months preceding May 1, 1985 and the twelve month 
period prior to May 1,1984, they would only have to remain in the temporary 
status for one year. A cap, however, of 350,000 persons was placed on the 
number of persons who can be placed in this one year temporary resident 
status. The actual number of persons, however, who may be eligible for 
ultimate eligibility for adjustment to temporary status in the one year and 
two year program is unknown and will only be revealed as the illegal 
immigrants come forth. 
In addition, the Schumer provisions note that, if after September 30, 1989 
the Secretaries of Agriculture and Labor jointly determine that there is a 
shortage of seasonal farm workers, a replenishment program is permitted 
for the fiscal years 1990 through 1993. Representative Schumer expressed 
the belief that "the vast majority of them [i.e., the initial group of illegal 
aliens who can become temporary resident aliens due to their existing 
employment histories], an extremely high percentage of them, will continue 
to work in agriculture" [Pear, 198613, D-221. There is, of course, nothing to 
guarantee that his assessment is correct. The number of replenishment 
workers who would be admissible would be determined by a complex formula 
based on the number of seasonal workers whose status was originally adjusted 
and the demonstrated need for additional workers. The law does state that 
there shall be no replenishment if there is no determination that a shortage 
exists. Furthermore, the entire program is terminated in 1994. 
As for temporary worker policy itself, the new law created a new H-2A 
subcategory for foreign temporary agriculture workers. Such workers will 
no longer be admitted under any other Section H category. The H-2A 
procedures will be streamlined to facilitate the operation of the program 
over what has hitherto existed for agricultural workers. It still requires 
employers to attempt to recruit domestic workers after they notify the 
Secretary of Labor at least 60 days before they anticipate a need for additional 
seasonal workers. The Secretary must give a decision on the need to admit 
H-2A workers within 20 days before the date that the workers are actually 
needed. If the Secretary determines that citizen workers are unavailable or if 
those deemed available prove to be unqualified, an expedited procedure for 
admitting H-2A workers is specified. Guaranteed assurances pertaining to 
housing, compensation, travel, and subsistence costs that were available 
under the previous H-2 program were also specified for H-2A workers. One 
change that was added, provides that legal services are for the first time to be 
made available to H-2A workers for disputes over work-related matters. 
CONCLUDING OBSER VA TIONS 
For almost a decade, attempts were made'to link temporary worker policy 
with legislation designed to curb illegal immigration. These efforts repre- 
sented a new rationalization for an old policy that was of questionable valid- 
ity even when applied in its traditional context. Historically, temporary 
worker policy had been implemented to meet manpower shortages during war 
times. The favorable conditions that these programs offer to employers has 
tended to exert a narcotic effect on their subsequent attitudes. They become 
quickly addicted to the programs since they do not have to compete as do 
employers in other industries to attract and to keep workers. Hence, the life 
of these programs tends to be prolonged well after the original justification 
for their existence ceases. Employers soon realize that temporary worker 
programs are essentially a form of wage subsidy that is authorized by the 
federal government. Hence, they seek to retain the programs by claiming 
that citizen workers are not available under the altered (i .e.,  depressed) 
market conditions that these very programs themselves created. 
Likewise, the long history of the nation with temporary programs vividly 
shows that it is difficult to enforce contractual terms and labor standards for 
foreign workers when, as in the case of agriculture, the workers are dispersed 
among numerous employers over a wide geographical rural area. The 
longer programs operate, the more difficult it is to monitor and enforce 
protections. Perhaps during wartime emergencies when arguments for these 
undertakings have the greatest validity, these abuses could be tolerated as an 
- - 
unavoidable evil. As an on-going instrument of public policy in peacetime, 
they can only serve as an embarassment to the nation and as a form of 
exploitation for many of those who are employed under their auspices. 
Worker protections exist to safeguard all of those who toil to produce the 
output of the society. It should make no difference if the workers are citizens 
or whether they want to be protected. Temporary worker programs have 
shown that they cannot function without corruption both in the selection of 
foreign workers in their homelands and in the actual implementation of the 
program by employers in the United States. The fact that both the Panetta- 
Morrison proposal in 1984 and the Wilson proposal in 1985 assiduously 
avoided concerns about job protections, program monitoring, or the avail- 
ability of housing for foreign workers revealed their actual purpose: to serve 
as an employer recruiting device for cheap farm labor. 
The addition of the Schumer Amendment did serve largely to remove the 
contentious temporary worker subject from the immigration reform drive. 
It must be clearly recognized that it is a "quick-fix". It is not a temporary 
worker program itself but, rather, a special amnesty program for illegal 
immigrant farmworkers and an agricultural labor gift for southwestern 
growers. It is a program that could never have been enacted on the basis of its 
own merits for it has none. By virtue of political trickery that denied both 
debate and a vote on its existence, it became a barnacle attached to the 
broader purpose immigration reform legislation that could not be removed. 
One can only hope that its operations are carefully monitored and that the 
predictable pleas of growers in 1989 for "replenishment workers" will be 
subjected to decisions based on demonstrated economic needs and not be 
another exercise of raw political witchcraft. 
As for the revised and newly named H-2A program, it does provide 
requirements for housing and transportation as well as wage, legal aid and 
job protections. Hence, it is a preferable alternative to any of the temporary 
worker proposals contained in the early versions of the Simpson-Rodino bill 
that omitted these safeguards. But even the premises of this program during 
peacetime are still suspect. The H-2A program perpetuates a situation by 
which no citizen worker can compete with those workers provided under its 
auspices. Easing access to the H-2A program will only enlarge the scope of 
the self-fulfilling prophecy of employers whereby they can contend that 
citizen workers are allegedly not available. 
Historically, temporary worker programs, have contributed significantly 
to the immigration phenomenon. Once exposed to the U.S. labor market, 
some will not return home and others who do go back will later return as 
illegal immigrants when the programs end or  they are not chosen to 
participate again. Thus, it remains to be seen if temporary worker policy 
will once again bedevil the new legislative effort to gain control of the illegal 
immigration problem. 
Appendix: H-2 Worker Data Problems 
As with every other dimension of the nation's immigration system, an 
appraisal of the size and occupational composition of the H-2 program for 
temporary workers is severely hampered by the gross lack of meaningful 
data. The U.S. Department of Labor performs the initial certification of the 
jobs for which employers are seeking foreign temporary workers. Tables 1 
and 2 indicate the number of certifications granted to employers for agri- 
cultural (since 1971) and for non-agricultural H-2 workers (since 1976) 
respectively. These figures, however, do not indicate the actual number of 
H-2 workers that were subsequently admitted to the United States. As noted 
in the tables, an employer may ultimately decide to fill only a portion of the 
approved jobs (or they may decide to fill none). Moreover, some H-2 
workers may have been contracted to work two or more certified jobs. Thus, 
the data can only provide a rough estimate of the maximum allowable 
number of H-2 workers who could have been admitted in each year - not the 
actual number who were. 
It is the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), however, that 
ultimately issues the visas that allow the H-2 workers into the country. But, 
tragically, the INS has been unable since 1978 to produce any reliable data 
pertaining to the number of H-2 workers. Relying upon unpublished 
material, INS officials can only produce "ball-park" estimates such as those 
cited in the body of this article as to the number of H-2 workers being 
admitted to the United States in the 1980s. For instance, the author was told 
that INS believes that roughly 24,500 workers were admitted in Fiscal Year 
1985. Of this number, they cannot even determine how many workers were 
employed in agriculture and how many were in non-agriculture. This is be- 
cause 18,000 visa forms that were turned-in for processing did not have to have 
TABLE 1 
Fiscal 
Year 
Number of Jobs 
Certified 
Note: a The  number of jobs certified does not indicate the actual number of foreign workers 
admitted for employment. An employer may use only part, or none, of the certifications granted. 
Also some admitted foreign workers may work in two or more certified jobs. 
Source: 1984 Annual Report: Labor Certification for Temporary Foreign Agricultural and Logging 
Worker (H-2's) U.S. Employment Service, Division of Foreign Labor Certifications, U.S. 
Department of Labor, (March 1, 1985), P. 2. 
occupation of the worker filled-in. Consequently, the country-of-origin of 
H-2 workers is used by the INS as a crude proxy to deduce whether the 
workers were employed in agriculture or non-agriculture. Thus, if the 
workers were from the Caribbean Islands in general (as were 12,600 of these 
visa holders in 1985), and from Jamaica in particular (as were 10,500 of these 
visa holders in 1985), the INS says it is fair to conclude that most of these 
workers were employed in agriculture in the United States during that year. 
As for the remainder who came from other countries, it is not possible to 
draw any reliable conclusion about their occupational distribution. 
INS officials apologetically acknowledge that they cannot provide what is 
needed most: an occupational distribution of H-2 workers for any year since 
1978. Aside from budgetary problems that hinder the effectiveness of most 
federal agencies, the problem, it seems, is a lack of priority given to research 
and policy issues within the agency itself. The INS is essentially a law 
TABLE 2 
Fiscal 
Year 
Number of Jobs 
Certified 
Note: a See, note on Table 2 
Source: Tabular material provided from records of the U.S. Employment Service (Tables 312 
and 208), U.S. Department of Labor. 
enforcement agency and its leadership hierarchy is staffed accordingly. The 
focus of available H-2 record-keeping is on the individual with little concern 
manifested about the importance of aggregate information. For enforcement 
reasons, the records are kept on the basis of personal names of the individual 
H-2 workers which introduces massive keying errors when any serious effort 
is made to tabulate aggregate data for policy evaluation. 
The creation of the new H-2A category as a separate and distinct entity 
under the Simpson-Rodino Act should greatly overcome the data nightmares 
that have plagued efforts to assess the agricultural worker aspects of temporary 
worker policy. There is no assurance, however, that the new law will improve 
the usefulness of this data for non-agricultural temporary workers admitted 
under Section H provisions. 
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